PAPERS
Works
in
(varying degrees of)
progress:
Composition as Identity [pdf] (last updated 10/8/2008)
Mental
Fictionalism [pdf]
(last updated: 10/19/07)
Abstract: Suppose
you are
somewhat persuaded by the arguments for Eliminative Materialism, but
are put off
by the view itself. For instance, you might be sympathetic to one or
more of the
following considerations: (1) that folk psychology is a bad theory and
will be
soon replaced by cognitive science or neuroscience, (2) that folk
psychology
will never be vindicated by cognitive science, (3) that folk psychology
makes
ontological commitments to weird or spooky things that no proper
science will
admit the existence of, (4) that folk psychology seems to lead to a
sort of
epiphenomenalism (which is yet another thing that’s weird
and
spooky), and
(5) that folk psychology seems to lead to the conclusion that mental
content is
either determined by things outside the head or is completely indeterminate,
neither of which is appealing. Yet in spite of your sympathy for any
one of
(1)-(5), you may nonetheless cringe at the consequence of them—that is,
you may
be unwilling to accept the Eliminative Materialist’s radical claim that
(i)
there are no beliefs, desires, etc., and (ii) we should stop all talk
to that
quantifies to the contrary. To relieve the conflict, I propose Mental
Fictionalism: the view that we are fictionalists about mental states.
Rearming the
Slingshot
[pdf] (last updated: 3/16/06)
Abstract: Slingshot
arguments are all the rage. And no wonder. For if they turn out to be
sound, our approach to most of metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and
philosophy of language would be brutally undermined. In
this paper I will (i) explore Stephen Neale’s recent reformulation
of Gödel’s slingshot, and his claims that such an argument
provides a
descriptive constraint for certain theories of facts, and (ii) address
Graham Oppy’s recent objections to Neale, detailing why I think at
least one of them is fairly
successful. My ultimate aim in this paper, however, is (iii) to present
a revised version of the slingshot
argument—one that piggy-backs on Neale’s formulation, but one that
strategically
avoids Oppy’s objections. This revised version will rely on Kaplan’s
notion of
‘dthat’—a
stipulated, technical operator that will allow us to secure a
referential
treatment of the terms used in the principles underlying the argument.
I hope
that this will show that whatever our
treatment of descriptions, the
slingshot can still be found to be threatening, perhaps even
devastating.
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Last
Updated: October 8, 2008